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THE COMPLAINT CONUNDRUM: THOUGHTS 
ON THE CFPB’S COMPLAINT MECHANISM 
Katherine Porter* 
The law requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to 
collect, monitor, and respond to consumer complaints regarding consumer 
financial products or services. This Article explores these duties. Its 
premise is that the CFPB’s complaint mechanism, even if carefully 
designed and heavily resourced, is unlikely to improve the overall level of 
consumer protection. While taking complaints will aid the CFPB in some of 
its duties, it also could erode some aspects of consumer protection. Those 
counterintuitive possibilities bring into sharper relief the issue of whether it 
is appropriate to task administrative agencies with resolving consumer 
complaints. What is the purpose of making the government—other than the 
court system—address complaints with nongovernment actors? The Article 
considers this fundamental question in the context of the CFPB, identifying 
theoretical and practical issues raised by the CFPB’s strategies to date for 
handling consumer complaints. 
*  *  * 
INTRODUCTION 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is heralded as a 
victory for consumers. It represents a commitment from the federal 
government to be attentive to the concerns of people as they engage in 
financial transactions. The CFPB should give consumers an ally and a 
resource in the credit marketplace. Its rule-writing, examination, and 
enforcement duties were hard-fought by its proponents and remain 
controversial, and perhaps unwelcome, by its critics. One of the CFPB’s 
major duties, however, receives universal praise. Its obligation to address 
complaints from consumers about financial transactions was supported by 
industry,1 advocates,2 and politicians.3 
The CFPB solves a major problem with the prior complaint regime for 
financial transactions. Because of fractured regulatory authority, consumers 
had difficulty identifying the appropriate agency to submit a complaint. 
With consolidated authority in the CFPB, there is a one-stop shop for 
aggrieved consumers. This victory seems to have satisfied all parties. But it 
                                                                                                                                
 *  Professor of Law at UC Irvine School of Law. 
 1. Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s New 
Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 79 (2009) (statement of Edward L. Yingling, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
American Bankers Association) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
 2. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 145 (2009) (statement of Travis Plunkett, 
Consumer Fed’n of America and Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG). 
 3. Id. at 1 (remarks of Congressman Barney Frank). 
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may also have blinded them to other, quite challenging issues with the 
CFPB’s complaint duties. 
The goal of this Article is to explore the purpose of a government-run 
consumer complaint mechanism and analyze its potential benefits and risks. 
I describe the law requiring the CFPB to develop a complaint mechanism 
and the CFPB’s approach to implementing those duties. I then articulate 
several reasons why the government might be tasked with hearing and 
responding to complaints that consumers make against nongovernment 
actors; I examine those reasons against the larger framework of consumer 
protection. I conclude that the CFPB’s complaint mechanism is not a clear 
victory for all. It will be difficult to achieve its potential, and even at best, 
taking complaints could undermine certain aspects of consumer protection.  
I. STATUTORY DUTIES REGARDING COMPLAINTS 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act) that creates the CFPB prescribes a rough architecture for 
the CFPB. It mandates that the CFPB have six specific units.4 The 
congressional requirement to have a particular unit likely reflects a strong 
consensus about the importance of that unit’s duties. While the CPFB could 
be structured differently over time, such as by the addition of divisions, 
Congress is clear that the six statutory units must remain identifiable 
components. This ensures that these assigned tasks remain a visible part of 
the Bureau. 
A complaint mechanism is one of the CFPB’s required units. The 
statute spells out the basic obligations of the CFPB complaint unit. 
(3) Collecting and Tracking Complaints.— 
(A) In General.—The Director shall establish a unit whose functions shall 
include establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a 
database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate the centralized 
collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer complaints 
regarding consumer financial products or services. . . .5 
The statute establishes three core tasks that the CFPB must perform 
with respect to complaints: collecting them, monitoring them, and 
responding to them. In later sections, the statute gives a comparatively high 
level of detail about how these tasks shall be executed. The result is that the 
CFPB has less flexibility in designing how to address consumer complaints 
than it enjoys for some of its other duties. Using the three duties—
                                                                                                                                
 4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, § 1013, 124 Stat. 1376, 1966 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (2010)) 
(requiring units dedicated to research, community affairs, collecting and tracking complaints, fair 
lending and equal opportunity, financial education, service members’ affairs, and older 
Americans’ affairs). 
 5. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969.  
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collecting, monitoring, and responding—as a framework, I explore the 
statutory obligations of the CFPB against the prior regime for complaints. 
A. CENTRALIZED CONTACT FOR CONSUMERS 
The CFPB’s first charge regarding complaints is to “collect” them. At 
minimum, this means that the CFPB must take consumer complaints. This 
obligation is unsurprising, given that under prior law, most financial 
regulators were required to take consumer complaints.6 
The major weakness of the prior regime was that consumers struggled 
to identify the appropriate regulator to contact. For a single financial 
product, such as a home mortgage, the regulator could be one of a dozen 
agencies and could be either state or federal. Because these regulators each 
had responsibility for the same financial products, 7 an aggrieved consumer 
with a mortgage problem would have to research the identity of the party 
selling the mortgage to know where to direct a complaint. To address this 
issue, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council created a web 
page where consumers type in the name of their financial institution and are 
given the name of its regulator.8 Yet, consumers had to know about this 
site’s existence, learn the correct name of their institution, be sure their 
institution was not a credit union (because those are not covered by the 
site), and then track down contact information for the appropriate 
regulator’s complaint mechanism. 
The fractured regulatory authority hampered consumers who tried to 
complain about financial services to the government. At the Federal 
Reserve Board in 2000, more than half of all complaints were referred to 
other agencies.9 Even the banking industry conceded that reform was 
needed. The American Bankers Association, which strenuously opposed a 
separate consumer regulator, supported the creation of a “centralized call 
center for consumers that could forward complaints to the right agency and 
serve as a coordinated information source.”10  
The CFPB consolidated authority for consumer protection and 
reoriented it to be based on the product sold, rather than the offering party. 
If the problem is a consumer financial product, then the consumer can 
                                                                                                                                
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (2006), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act § 1092(3), 124 Stat. at 2095 
(requiring that major prudential regulators receive complaints). 
 7. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 16 (“Consumer 
financial products are regulated based, principally, on the identity of the issuer, rather than the 
nature of the product.”). 
 8. FFIEC’s Consumer Help Center, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www 
.ffiec.gov/consumercenter/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 9. Jeanne M. Hogarth & Maureen P. English, Consumer Complaints and Redress: An 
Important Mechanism for Protecting and Empowering Consumers, 26 INT’L J. CONSUMER 
STUDIES 217, 220 (2002). 
 10. Hearing, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Edward L. Yingling).  
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contact the CFPB regardless of which entity licenses or supervises the 
business. 
The statute contains several directives aimed at reducing consumer 
confusion about where to submit complaints. The CFPB must provide 
telephone access via a “single” telephone number.11 This improves the prior 
regulatory situation, in which a consumer might have to call several 
prudential regulators to determine which one had oversight over the 
financial actor that had aggrieved them. The statute also specifies the 
“centralized collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer 
complaints.”12 Congress clearly wanted the CFPB to be a single portal of 
entry for consumers with complaints. 
The statute does recognize that the CFPB may not, in fact, be the 
appropriate regulator for some consumer complaints. It provides that “the 
Director shall coordinate with the Federal Trade Commission or other 
Federal agencies to route complaints to such agencies,”13 and that state 
agencies may receive routed calls about “appropriate complaints.”14 The 
description of the permitted procedure as “routing” complaints is consistent 
with the idea that the CFPB must be available as an initial first point of 
contact for consumers. 
A single portal for consumer complaints is a natural result of the 
consolidation of authority in the CFPB. Thus, the mere creation of the 
CFPB resolves the major “complaint” about the handling of complaints. On 
this issue, the CFPB clearly represents an advance over the prior system. 
B. CREATING COMPLAINT DATA 
The second duty of the CFPB is to “monitor” complaints. The contours 
of this duty are somewhat unclear. The subsection’s title uses the phrase 
“collect and track,” and perhaps “monitor” and “track” are synonyms. The 
monitoring duty seems to require that, at minimum, the CFPB cannot just 
take complaints. It must do something to understand their origin, content, 
and disposition. The statute also requires an annual report to Congress on 
the prior year’s complaints. “Such report shall include information and 
analysis about complaint numbers, complaint types, and, where applicable, 
information about resolution of complaints.”15 This type of monitoring is 
mostly a counting task. It does not seem to require the CFPB to track how 
any particular complaint is being handled. Rather, its purpose seems to be 
to work in tandem with the collecting task to ensure that the CFPB is 
“hearing” the public’s negative experiences with financial products. 
                                                                                                                                
 11. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5493(b)(3)(A)). 
 12. Id. (emphasis added). 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1969.  
 15. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1969.  
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The monitoring duty has another aspect. The CFPB is required to share 
consumer complaint information with the prudential regulators, the Federal 
Trade Commission, other federal agencies, and state agencies.16 In turn, 
those entities are required to share their consumer complaint data with the 
CFPB.17 This aggregation is designed to “facilitate” the “supervision and 
enforcement activities” of the CFPB, and to aid it in “monitoring of the 
market for consumer financial products and services.”18 It appears that the 
data sharing was designed to give the CFPB a comprehensive view of 
consumers’ frustrations to allow it to better perform its oversight of 
financial institutions. This is quite an entirely separate responsibility with 
respect to consumer complaints than being responsive to aggrieved 
consumers. Indeed, the CFPB could use information gleaned from 
monitoring complaints to write a rule to eliminate a troublesome practice 
without any actions whatsoever to acknowledge, respond to, or obtain 
redress for any consumer on an individual level. 
C. RESPONDING TO CONSUMERS 
The CFPB’s third duty, however, is to respond to complaints. This 
obligation was apparently not present in some early formulations of the 
CFPB’s duties. In a hearing one year before the Dodd-Frank Act was 
passed, a consumer advocate stated that while collecting and tracking 
complaints was a “very important function,” the proposed agency should 
also be “charged with resolving consumer complaints.”19 This history may 
explain why the CFPB’s duty to respond to complaints appears in a separate 
section of Title X of Dodd-Frank, one that is not even proximate to the 
section discussed above on “collecting and tracking” complaints. 
Section 1034 is titled “Response to Consumer Complaints and 
Inquiries.” It imposes on the CFPB a duty to establish “reasonable 
procedures to provide a timely response to consumers” who make 
complaints.20 The statute describes the content of the response as 
including— 
(1) steps that have been taken by the regulator in response to the 
complaint or inquiry of the consumer; 
(2) any responses received by the regulator from the covered person [this 
is the term for the businesses that the CFPB regulates]; and 
                                                                                                                                
 16. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 1969–70. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Hearing, supra note 1, at 99 (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer 
Fed’n of Am.).  
 20. Dodd-Frank Act § 1034(a), 124 Stat. at 2008 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5534).  
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(3) any follow-up actions or planned follow-up actions by the regulator in 
response to the complaint or inquiry of the consumer.21 
There is a parallel statute that imposes identical duties on “covered 
persons” to provide responses to the CFPB concerning complaints.22 These 
laws establish a communication chain: businesses (a.k.a., covered persons) 
must respond to the CFPB, and the CFPB must respond to consumers. 
These duties do not mean that the consumer can simply rely on the CFPB to 
negotiate with the business. The statute contemplates that the business will 
work with the consumers to resolve the complaint and then must share 
information on whether that process occurred and how it proceeded with the 
CFPB for oversight. 
This tripartite structure is less robust than it may appear at first blush. 
While it imposes obligations to share information, it seemingly does not 
require that any action occur with respect to consumer complaints. That is, 
steps taken, responses received, or follow-up plans must be communicated 
from business to the CFPB and from the CFPB to consumer but, 
presumably, if the CFPB and the business take no action, they need only 
communicate that fact in a “timely response.”23 Could the following letter 
satisfy the CFPB’s statutory duty? 
Dear Consumer: 
We collected your complaint. We added it to our database. We have taken 
no steps with respect to your complaint, have received no response from a 
business regarding it, and do not plan any follow-up. 
Sincerely, 
Consumer Complaint Unit, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that Congress intended the statute to 
impose an affirmative duty to do something more than generate such letters 
                                                                                                                                
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. § 1034(b), 124 Stat. at 2009. 
A covered person subject to supervision and primary enforcement by the Bureau 
pursuant to section 1025 shall provide a timely response, in writing where appropriate, 
to the Bureau, the prudential regulators, and any other agency having jurisdiction over 
such covered person concerning a consumer complaint or inquiry, including— 
(1) steps that have been taken by the covered person to respond to the complaint or 
inquiry of the consumer; 
(2) responses received by the covered person from the consumer; and 
(3) follow-up actions or planned follow-up actions by the covered person to respond to 
the complaint or inquiry of the consumer.).  
Id. 
 23. Id. § 1304(a), 124 Stat. at 2008.  
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in response to consumer complaints. And, of course, the CFPB in fact will 
likely do much more than the statutory minimum.24 
A weak duty to respond, however, may be the norm for government 
action on consumer complaints.25 Under the prior regime for financial 
regulators, many consumers did not receive any redress after complaining. 
Since 1975, federal law has required the regulators of financial institutions 
to address consumer complaints. “In order to prevent unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices,” the regulators were to “establish a separate division of 
consumer affairs which shall receive and take appropriate action upon 
complaints.”26 The regulations fleshed out the concept of “appropriate 
action” to require regulators to provide consumers “a substantive response 
or an acknowledgment setting a reasonable time for a substantive response” 
to be “sent to the individual making the complaint” within fifteen days after 
receipt of a written complaint.27 The regulations do not seem to provide a 
definition of substantive response. 
Although it seems clear that more than an acknowledgement of receipt 
of complaint was intended, consumer advocates reported that federal 
regulators often took no action on complaints that were legitimate and 
reflected serious or repeated violations.28 These problems with complaint 
handling cannot be explained by the tremendous increase in the size and 
influence of the financial industry nor the alleged nearly complete 
regulatory capture of some entities, such as the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC). In the heyday of consumer protection—in 1976—a 
congressional report found serious shortcomings in how consumer affairs 
offices dealt with complaints. 
None of the consumer affairs offices (or Washington offices of those 
agencies without consumer affairs offices) become involved in the actual 
investigation of the consumer complaints which they receive. . . . The 
method of investigation of consumer complaints most frequently used by 
all agencies is to request details concerning the complaint from the 
financial institution complained about. This method puts primary reliance 
on the financial institution’s version of the problem. Consumers are rarely 
                                                                                                                                
 24. While the “timely response” should include the steps, responses, and follow-up actions, the 
statute does not preclude a more comprehensive response. 
 25. An examination of government and nongovernment complaint systems concluded that 
government systems are not significantly better. See generally Laura Nader, Disputing Without the 
Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act § 1092, 124 Stat. at 2094–95 (2010). 
 27. 12 C.F.R. § 227.2 (2012). 
 28. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services—Consumer and Industry 
Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 43 (2007) (statement of 
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Am.). 
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contacted for additional details and examiners are rarely sent out to 
conduct on-site investigations of consumer complaints.29 
Thirty years later, the OCC was the subject of a similar study of its 
complaint handling. The report’s title, OCC Consumer Assistance: Process 
Is Similar to That of Other Regulators but Could Be Improved by Enhanced 
Outreach, gives away the punch line.30 The Government Accountability 
Office found that the OCC largely was like the other federal banking 
regulators. It resolved most complaints by “providing information to 
consumers” in the form of referring consumers to other regulators or 
advising them to seek counsel.31 Consumers were required to submit a 
written complaint form for the OCC to take action on the complaint; if the 
consumer failed to do so, the OCC considered the complaint “withdrawn.”32 
As a result of these procedures, consumers rarely received the “substantive 
response” that seems to be required by regulation. In 2004, the OCC 
reported only 20 percent of all complaints resolved; the remainder were 
either marked as informational or withdrawn.33 This suggests that the OCC 
actually investigated only a modest fraction of all complaints. The vast 
majority of consumers contacting a prudential regulator with a complaint 
did not receive a response that reflected any investigation. 
The efficacy of the regulators in dealing with complaints was contested. 
An article describing the Federal Reserve Board’s process states that it does 
“look into every complaint.”34 The agencies did have dozens of employees 
in complaint departments, and millions of dollars were spent in aggregate 
on collecting and responding to consumers’ complaints about financial 
institutions. 
Because it was created to improve the level of consumer protection and 
to address criticisms of prudential regulators, the CFPB almost certainly has 
a heavier burden to respond to complaints than the prior regulators. The 
statute requires a “response” rather than an “appropriate action”—a pretty 
clear effort from Congress to ensure that individual consumers receive more 
help after complaining. The exact nature of that help remains unclear, 
                                                                                                                                
 29. STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., DO FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES LISTEN TO CONSUMERS? 1–2 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Staff 
Report] (emphasis omitted). 
 30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-293, OCC CONSUMER ASSISTANCE: 
PROCESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF OTHER REGULATORS BUT COULD BE IMPROVED BY ENHANCED 
OUTREACH (2006). 
 31. Id. at 3.  
 32. Id. at 17.  
 33. Id. at 15.  
 34. FRB: Current FAQs, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www 
.federalreserve.gov/faqs/credit_12666.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
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however, as difficult challenges will confront the CFPB in carrying out its 
statutory duties to collect, monitor, and respond to complaints.35 
II. CFPB’S APPROACH TO COMPLAINTS 
The CFPB is a young organization, about eighteen months old. Its 
design and implementation of its duties are still in progress. Because its 
duties to handle complaints (unlike its rule-writing and enforcement 
powers) did not require a Director, the CFPB could begin its work on 
consumer complaints immediately. To date, the CFPB has tackled only a 
portion of its complaint obligations. In this section, I describe the CFPB’s 
actions thus far and evaluate them against its statutory duties. 
The CFPB has taken a product-by-product approach to complaints. This 
is consistent with consolidation of authority for consumer protection issues 
in the CFPB, regardless of the prudential regulator of the company that 
offered the product. Its website’s complaint page begins by asking the 
consumer to identify the product at issue.36 Currently, the CFPB has a 
mechanism for seven categories of consumer financial products: bank 
accounts or service, credit cards, credit reporting, money transfers, home 
loans, student loans, and vehicle or consumer loans.37 
A. CREDIT CARDS AND MORTGAGES 
On its opening day as a separate entity, July 21, 2011, the CFPB rolled 
out a website that permitted consumers to submit complaints about their 
credit cards.38 In December 2011, the CFPB began to handle complaints 
about a second product—home mortgages. Neither site publishes a toll-free 
phone number or a mailing address as alternate submission routes. The 
former is particularly surprising in light of the specific statutory language 
requiring a toll-free number for complaints.39 The site does offer a live 
online chat with a representative for twelve hours each week day, although 
this tool would not seem to address the problem of consumers who lack 
web access or computer sophistication. To find the mailing address or 
phone number, consumers have to go to another area of the site entirely, 
                                                                                                                                
 35. The CFPB could take on additional duties with respect to complaints. Section 1013 states 
that the functions “shall include” establishing centralized means for aggrieved consumers to 
contact the CFPB and a database of complaints. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,  
§ 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. 1367, 2008 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (2010)). That 
language leaves open the possibility of additional kinds of activity with respect to complaints.  
 36. Consumer Questions and Complaints, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/get-help 
-now/consumer-questions-and-complaints/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
     37. Submit a Complaint, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Jan. 
16, 2013). 
 38. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 39. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969 (codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5493(b)(3)(A)). 
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“Contact Us,” where a phone number and post office box are given.40 
Perhaps partially as a result, 44 percent of complaints submitted directly to 
the CFPB came via its website.41 
The CFPB’s web form for credit cards asks consumers to “describe 
what happened so we can understand the issue” and contains a large text 
box.42 The consumer inputs a narrative. Below that, there is a long list of 
credit card-related issues and the consumer is asked to mark the single 
category that best describes their complaint.43 Those categories are 
imprecise and imperfect. Some categories are very large, such as 
“transaction issue.” Other categories seem to overlap; for example, there 
would seem to be no obvious difference between “collection practices” and 
“collection debt dispute.” The main use of such categories at this point may 
be to develop a program to analyze the consumer’s own description of the 
problem. The CFPB could use a natural language algorithm to try to 
identify the nature of a complaint—without any human reading the 
complaint. It could check the output of the algorithm against the 
consumer’s self-identified category of the complaint and refine the 
algorithm accordingly. To date, this idea is not deployed.  
The CFPB site asks several other questions of complainants, including 
the amount of the dispute, what techniques they tried before contacting the 
CFPB, and if the consumer believes the company engaged in 
discrimination. After submitting that information, the consumer is asked to 
describe in her own words “What do you think would be a fair resolution to 
your issue?” The form then gathers information about the consumer and the 
product. Upon submission, the consumer is given a tracking number. The 
consumer can check the status of their complaint by using a login created as 
part of the submission process to revisit the web page. 
The complaint intake for mortgages is substantially similar to the one 
described above for credit cards. It is a web form, primarily consisting of 
open-ended text boxes for the consumer to describe the problem and the 
relief sought.44 The mortgage form has far fewer closed-ended categories 
for the type of problem. It asks consumers to identify “which part of the 
mortgage process is your issue related to” from five choices: applying for 
                                                                                                                                
 40. Contact Us, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/contact-us/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2012). In its most recent semi-annual report, the CFPB emphasizes its call center, noting that it 
handles calls with little or no wait time, is U.S.-based, and provides services in 187 languages and 
for hearing- and speech-impaired consumers. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 16 (2012) [hereinafter SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/Congressional_Report_Jan2012.pdf. 
 41. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17.  
 42. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask 
(last visited on Sept. 20, 2012).  
 43. Id.  
 44. File a Mortgage Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/mortgage/ask 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2012).  
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the loan, receiving a credit offer, signing the agreement, making payments, 
and problems when you are unable to pay.45 The mortgage categories do not 
overlap, are broad in nature, and identify moments in a transaction rather 
than a substantive legal issue. There seems to be a different strategy to 
building a typology of mortgage complaints than credit card complaints. It 
seems likely to me that the variation in categories in the credit card form 
and mortgage form reflect different teams of people building complaint 
systems for different products, rather than a coherent and thoughtful 
strategy based on the products themselves. 
B. RESPONSES TO COMPLAINTS 
The CFPB does not review complaints in the first instance. Its website 
describes the basic process. “We’ll forward your issue to your [credit 
card/mortgage] company, give you a tracking number, and keep you 
updated on the status of your complaint.”46 The benchmark for evaluating 
this referral process is the statutory language requiring the CFPB to 
“respond” to complaints. The adequacy of the CFPB’s “receive and refer” 
approach will turn on how businesses deal with forwarded complaints and 
the CFPB’s efforts to ensure that such responses are adequate. 
The CFPB has a web portal to communicate to companies that a 
complaint was made. The web portal permits companies to acknowledge 
complaints and mark their status. The Company Portal Manual provides 
detail about what businesses are to do with complaints to satisfy the 
CFPB’s rules.47 Businesses have fifteen days to select one of four 
responses: closed with relief, closed without relief, in progress, and alerted 
CFPB. If the business does not select a response in fifteen days, the web 
portal flags the complaint and prioritizes it for investigation by the CFPB 
Consumer Response unit, a group of non-lawyer investigators. 
The Company Portal Manual defines the four responses available to 
businesses. Selecting “in progress” gives the business sixty days to close 
the complaint, with or without relief.48 If the business fails to update the 
status after sixty days, it is automatically changed to “No Response,” which 
prioritizes it for investigation by Consumer Response.49 “Alerted CFPB” is 
a category that tells the CFPB of a problem that limits the company’s ability 
to respond, such as suspected fraud in making the complaint or that the 
complaint is already the subject of pending legal action.50 
                                                                                                                                
 45. Id.  
 46. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 47. CFPB, COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL (Nov. 21, 2011)  
[hereinafter COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL], available at http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files 
/2012/01/CFPBCompanyPortalManualv2.pdf. 
 48. Id. at 8. 
 49. Id. at 12.  
 50. Id. at 13.  
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If it categorizes a complaint as “closed,” the business is to provide 
detail to support that it has given a “final responsive explanation to the 
consumer.”51 The required information tracks the provisions of Dodd-Frank 
section 1034, including communications from the consumer and follow-up 
actions or planned follow-up actions.52 The business is to “attach copies of 
all responsive written communications to the consumer.”53 The Manual 
states that “relief” is defined by the CFPB as “objective, measurable, and 
verifiable monetary value to the consumer as a direct result of the steps you 
have taken or will take in response to the complaint. If relief has been or 
will be provided, describe the relief and enter the dollar amount of that 
relief.”54 From my research, I conclude that this is the most robust 
formulation of relief for consumer complaints in use by the federal 
government. The definition is not the law, because it is not a rule made after 
notice and comment pursuant to the CFPB’s statutory powers. Industry may 
contest the definition in favor of a different, lesser standard in the future. Or 
future CFPB leadership may relax the standard.  
The CFPB definition of relief has some other limitations. First, the 
requirement of monetary relief seems to evince a belief that banks should 
spend money to help consumers. But some complaints may not be for 
monetary harms. Consider complaints based on rude behavior by a 
customer service representative or having to resubmit lost paperwork. There 
arguably was no monetary harm in such instances. Other complaints may 
reflect harms that are difficult to monetize. A consumer who experiences 
lending discrimination or debt collection abuses has suffered real harm, and 
money damages are available if the consumer filed and won a private 
lawsuit. Without a jury to determine damages, however, it is unclear what 
the appropriate dollar amount a consumer should receive without either 
under- or overcompensation. 
The requirement that the relief be objective and measurable may also 
undermine some kinds of relief that consumers actually find meaningful. In 
other legal contexts, such as criminal law and medical malpractice, there is 
a rich literature on the value of apology.55 Apologies can be highly valuable 
in making a consumer feel that a wrong was righted. Yet, a letter admitting 
an error and apologizing would not seem to satisfy the CFPB definition. 
The emphasis in the CFPB’s Manual seems to be on enabling it to 
count, view, and report on the outcome to the consumer. Like prior 
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regulators, the CFPB also surveys consumers after the complaint procedure 
is complete to measure their satisfaction. But the CFPB surely will not rely 
only on such data to evaluate whether the relief was sufficient. The effect is 
to require the business to satisfy both the consumer—so that she makes a 
favorable report on the outcome of the complaint to the CFPB—and the 
CFPB itself, which could use the data on the relief given to create a 
benchmark on whether the relief was sufficient. 
C. COMPLAINT DATA 
The CFPB is required by statute to provide an annual report to 
Congress on its complaint operations every March 31.56 The first such 
report was released in 2012.57 The CFPB also must provide semi-annual 
reports that cover a range of topics, including “an analysis of complaints 
about consumer financial products or services that the Bureau has received 
and collected in its central database on complaints during the preceding 
year.”58 These publications will allow policymakers, industry, advocates, 
and, of course, the public to assess the CFPB’s complaint mechanism. It is 
not only the CFPB that is to “track” and “monitor” complaints. Instead, as 
part of that duty, the CFPB is to facilitate the ability of other entities to 
evaluate its work in handling complaints. 
The CFPB’s final policy statement describes the circumstances under 
which the CFPB will disclose credit card complaint data.59 The statement is 
clear that the CFPB will not disclose any information from complaints that 
would be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. Consumers’ 
personally identifiable information, including names, will not be revealed.60 
The CFPB will not disclose to the public a consumers’ or companies’ 
narrative responses because they may contain confidential consumer 
information or material protected from disclosure under law.61 
The CFPB will withhold the narrative data because of privacy 
concerns.62 While this seems sensible, it creates a marked consequence for 
the CFPB’s approach of relying nearly exclusively on narratives to gather 
the complaint data. If the CFPB were to ask more closed-ended questions, 
more complaint data would be available for disclosure and analysis. This 
creates considerable pressure on the CFPB to ask the “right” questions in its 
complaint form to permit identification of the nature of consumers’ 
grievances. 
                                                                                                                                
 56. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1969 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (2010)).  
 57. CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 4 n.3 (2012).  
 58. Dodd-Frank Act § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974–75 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c)(4)). 
 59. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558 (June 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-06-22/pdf/2012-15163.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 37,569 (Policy Statement § 2(e)).  
 61. Id. at 37,568 (Policy Statement § 2(e)). 
 62. Id. at 37,568 (Policy Statement § 1).   
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The CFPB will disclose non-narrative data from complaints.63 The data 
will be available in fully searchable and downloadable format.64 The data 
will also be used in CFPB reports.65 The CFPB’s policy statement provides 
that a complaint will be added to the public database within fifteen days of 
receipt, in most instances, and other information about the complaint will be 
updated daily.66 It also states that the CFPB will publish complaint reports 
“at periodic intervals.”67 However, these terms are subject to interpretation 
and could vary over time. The intent of disclosure is to “improve the 
transparency and efficiency of the credit card market,”68 which would seem 
to require relatively rapid disclosure—measured in months, not years—of 
the complaint data. 
While it notes that the reliability of such data are disputed because 
complainants are certainly a nonrandom subset of all users of a financial 
product, the CFPB anticipates that disclosed complaint data’s primary use 
would be study “for trends and patterns” by “academics and groups 
dedicated to empowering consumers in making well-informed decisions.”69 
It minimizes the potential use of such data by industry, stating in a footnote 
to the preceding quoted sentence that “[i]n addition, issuers would likely 
mine the data and might publicize to consumers how their complaint 
performance measures up against competitors.”70 If the data reflect better 
performance by some actors, then marketing on that basis would enhance 
the marketplace for financial products. The CFPB notes, however, that 
complaint rates and resolutions may vary for reasons other than provider 
quality.71 For example, more complex products may result in more 
complaints, and some providers may specialize in such products. Or, 
businesses with effective internal complaint procedures may have fewer 
consumers that reach out to the CFPB. The CFPB’s thoughtful analysis of 
these problems suggests that it will be sensitive to such issues in using 
complaint data for purposes such as rule-writing and consumer education. 
III. ASSESSING THE CFPB’S COMPLAINT MECHANISM 
In its first-ever semi-annual report, the CFPB provided data on the 
complaints received and their dispositions. These data, along with the rules 
and statutes discussed above, permit a tentative assessment of the CFPB’s 
likely effectiveness with regard to its complaint resolution function. 
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A. CONSUMERS’ COMPLAINTS 
In the roughly six-month period beginning July 2011, the CFPB 
received 13,210 consumer complaints.72 Most of these (9,307) pertained to 
credit cards.73 This is not surprising given that the CFPB took credit card 
complaints for the entire period. In only one month, December 2011, CFPB 
received 2,326 mortgage complaints.74 It is impossible to evaluate the 
CFPB’s success in attracting complaints without comparable data on how 
many complaints were received collectively by the prudential regulators in 
the preceding periods. The economy is also a factor. The slowdown or halt 
in foreclosures may have limited the impetus for consumers to complain 
about mortgage problems. On the other hand, tight standards for 
underwriting may increase complaints about applying for or obtaining 
credit. Similarly, legal changes will affect complaint volume. The Credit 
Card Act of 200975 may have eliminated many practices that were most 
likely to aggrieve consumers, reducing complaints for that product. 
These concerns reveal that the raw numbers of complaints have little 
meaning on their own. Their best use may be to chart trends over time. If 
the CFPB enacts new rules and complaints continue to trend upward, the 
rules may have missed the mark or may not be translating into relief on the 
ground for consumers. Similarly, a spike in complaints that consumers 
categorize as being “other” in nature could reflect the development of a new 
industry practice that is troubling to consumers. The larger issue is that the 
CFPB’s entire purpose is to reduce complaints from consumers about 
financial products and services. If its rulemaking initiatives are successful, 
fewer complaints will be filed. However, fewer complaints could also 
evidence poor effort by the CFPB to promote its complaint mechanism or 
weak enforcement of its complaint duties. 
The CFPB report gives detail on the complaints filed using the 
categories on the web input form.76 For credit cards, 69.5 percent of 
complaints were in one of ten categories. The most popular category was 
“billing disputes,” which is broad enough to capture a wide swath of 
problems, including those with their own category such as late fees, APR or 
interest rates, or collection disputes. Tellingly, the third most popular 
category of complaints is “other,” capturing 9.2 percent of consumer 
input.77 This is particularly noteworthy given that this appears at the bottom 
of the list of categories on the CFPB’s web form and requires consumers to 
take the additional step of describing the “other” in their own words. These 
                                                                                                                                
 72. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17. 
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categories of data seem to have little value for rulemaking, legislative 
advocacy, or enforcement. The responses are too diffuse, the categories are 
too broad, and the reliance on consumer interpretation is too great. 
As described above, the mortgage categories focus on points in the 
process rather than substantive violations. Although there are fewer 
categories and they seem more distinct, consumers still chose “other” in 
23.2 percent of instances.78 The most popular categories—unsurprisingly 
given the economy—related to “problems when you are unable to pay” at 
38.2 percent and “making payments” at 21.5 percent.79 Without 
subcategories, it is impossible to discern whether consumers were 
complaining about legal violations, such as a misapplied payment or an 
abuse of the foreclosure process, or were writing to the CFPB because they 
wanted a loan modification in the form of a principal write-down or 
refinance. The former is squarely in the purview of the CFPB’s core duties 
to protect consumers, while the latter raises larger issues about economic 
policy that concern the Treasury, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
Housing and Urban Development. At least in their first iteration, the 
mortgage data, like the credit card data, offer only a weak foundation for 
understanding the level of consumer protection. 
B. COMPANIES’ RESPONSES 
A firmer basis for evaluating the design of the CFPB’s complaint 
mechanism is the response data. The CFPB reports that in its first six 
months, 75 percent of all complaints were sent to companies for review and 
action.80 This may seem impressive. The referral process is highly 
automated, however, so that forwarding complaints would seem to be an 
easy task. 
The CFPB is transparent about the disposition of the quarter of 
complaints that do not reach companies. About 11 percent of them were 
referred to other regulatory agencies.81 It will be instructive to see if this 
fraction drops as the CFPB enables its complaint capacity for the complete 
array of financial products and services. Consumers fail to make complete 
complaints in 5.4 percent of instances.82 This percentage is odd, given that 
the web form requires the consumer to complete a certain amount of 
information to even be able to submit a complaint. The CFPB may be able 
to reduce incomplete complaints if it analyzes what aspects of the form give 
consumers the most difficulty and redesigns them accordingly. Pending 
responses account for the other 8.9 percent of complaints, with that fraction 
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split about evenly between consumers and the CFPB as to which party has 
responsibility to take the next action.83 
The key to evaluating the CFPB’s complaint system is data on how 
companies respond to complaints. The early data are moderately 
encouraging. The CFPB reports that companies have responded to 88.1 
percent of the complaints sent to them.84 Over half (55 percent) of all 
complaints sent to businesses were “closed with relief provided” to 
consumers.85 Approximately 31 percent of complaints were closed without 
relief.86 The remaining portion remained with the company for review.87 
There will always be some complaints pending, given that submission is a 
rolling process and companies have between fifteen and sixty days to 
respond as described above.88 The portal for companies and the timeline for 
responses are working as transmission channels to funnel complaints from 
the CFPB to businesses. Upon receipt, businesses are processing those 
complaints rather than letting them linger. These are positive notes.  
The current data reveal little about the nature of relief provided to 
consumers and why no relief was provided in some instances. The CFPB 
uses the term “consumer review” to describe its process for asking 
consumers whether the business’s response was adequate. Consumers had 
not responded to almost half (47.5 percent) of the CFPB’s requests for 
feedback on the company’s resolution.89 This may reflect that the complaint 
process is in its infancy; consumers often may let these e-mails or letters 
linger before giving the CFPB feedback on the business’s response. 
Alternatively, and probably more likely, the low rate of response to the 
CFPB could reflect a serious weakness in the design of the complaint 
mechanism. Consumers may simply not see any value in responding to the 
CFPB, but that could stem from two very different reasons: (1) because 
consumers are satisfied with the resolution, or (2) because consumers are 
unsatisfied with the resolution. In either case, consumers may think it a 
waste of time to respond to the CFPB. The crux of the problem is that we 
cannot know the relative size of either of these groups. Those who do not 
respond to the CFPB’s request for feedback may not be the same population 
as those who do respond. This makes it difficult to have confidence in the 
data from the half of consumers who did respond. Analysis by the CFPB 
could ameliorate this concern to some degree. 
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To the extent the feedback data are valid, their interpretation is 
complicated. In 12.9 percent of cases, consumers provided feedback to the 
CFPB that they “disputed [the] company’s reported resolution.”90 
Consumers who “did not dispute the company’s reported resolution” were 
39.6 percent of all closed cases.91 These consumers accepted the company’s 
response as valid—regardless of whether the business provided them with 
relief.92 One is tempted to interpret these categories as “failure” and 
“success” rates, respectively. Certainly, they represent the “worst” and 
“best” outcomes in the CFPB’s current taxonomy for resolution status. 
However, consumers may accept a company’s response even if that 
response is unfair or incomplete.93 They may believe that if their complaint 
did not generate relief or only generated relief of a given amount, that such 
an outcome is the best possible outcome. In their mindset, if the CFPB 
could only help them get “X,” then “X” is the relief that their complaint 
merited. This is almost certainly true in many instances, but the data as 
currently disclosed do not permit an evaluation of the actual relief offered. 
Conversely, consumers may dispute a company’s resolution of their 
complaint even if the company acted in compliance with the law or was 
even generous in its resolution. Some consumers will request impossible or 
ridiculous relief, just as others will cave for a modicum of accommodation 
or help. Without a substantive audit of the nature of the complaint and the 
relief provided, it is difficult to know whether to accept consumers’ 
evaluations at face value. They provide only a self-reported measure of 
consumer satisfaction, not an actual assessment of consumer protection. 
Another fatal flaw in the CFPB’s report is that it does not permit a 
determination of the overlap in categories to determine the percentage of 
those who received relief and did not dispute that relief. The statistics 
simply do not provide enough transparency to understand how the CFPB’s 
complaint mechanism is faring in its early efforts. The danger, of course, is 
that the CFPB builds out its entire capacity without a more careful 
examination of its efforts to date. 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONSUMER: PURPOSES OF 
COMPLAINT MECHANISMS 
A lack of necessary data is not the only barrier to evaluating the 
CFPB’s complaint system. A more fundamental problem is a lack of 
consensus about the purpose of the government acting on behalf of 
consumers aggrieved with nongovernment actors. Without a clear 
exposition of the goals of a complaint mechanism, its evaluation is fraught 
with difficulties. Parties may dispute its success because they are using 
different metrics, and the complaint mechanism could be manipulated to 
serve varying purposes over time. Using the CFPB as an illustrative 
example, this section develops arguments for why the government should 
address complaints and assesses the reasonableness of such expectations. It 
exposes the weak theoretical framework for government complaint handling 
that makes it challenging to evaluate the CFPB’s work on complaints. 
A. EXPRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT (CF. VOTING) 
A simple point to begin the discussion is that the complaints at issue are 
not grievances with the government. The counterparty to the consumer’s 
complaint is a private actor. This contrasts with situations in which the 
government is being asked to change its own actions, such as a denial of 
government benefits or to provide recompense for a tort committed by a 
government actor. The CFPB’s complaint mechanism puts the government 
in a mediating role between private actors with a dispute. America has an 
entire branch of government—the courts—that performs just this function 
(although, of course, courts also decide matters between government and 
private citizens). The complaints directed to administrative agencies are 
sometimes precursors to lawsuits, but that is not required. The CFPB and 
most government agencies are not clearinghouses for litigation; there is no 
administrative exhaustion requirement to file an action for any violation of 
federal or state consumer law. When it takes complaints from individuals 
about businesses, the government is not performing an adjudicative 
function. 
A crisp purpose for the government as complaint handler is largely 
unarticulated. One expression, in a general form, seems to be that such a 
role is an outgrowth of democracy. The right to complain to the government 
about private parties—and to expect the government to be responsive in 
return—is a way for the government to serve the people. In this way, it 
supplements core citizen rights such as voting, filing suit against the 
government in court, or exercising free speech rights. 
In the consumer rights context, this concept dates back at least to 
President John F. Kennedy. The 1962 Consumer Bill of Rights included the 
right to “be assured that consumer interests will receive full and 
sympathetic consideration in the formulation of Government policy, and 
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fair and expeditious treatment in its administrative tribunals.”94 The first 
part of this right could be completely satisfied without the government 
responding to complaints. It is instead an expressive right. The government 
collecting and monitoring complaints, and using them in policy, would 
satisfy this goal even if it never pursued any redress for consumers. 
Complaint mechanisms improve democracy by providing a conduit for 
consumers to express their problems and desired solutions. 
President Richard Nixon’s articulation of the consumer rights concept 
expanded the idea to suggest redress. He added to the Consumer Bill of 
Rights the consumer’s right “to register his dissatisfaction, and have his 
complaint heard and weighed, when his interests are badly served.”95 This 
gives the government at least some responsibility to determine if the 
consumer’s complain has merit. The reference to a consumer’s “interests” 
in President Nixon’s statements is ambiguous. Are those the interests that 
an individual has as a private party—a consumer? Or are the interests those 
of an individual as a partner in a civic relationship—as a citizen—when the 
government does not perform its functions in ways that respect the position 
of consumers? 
One way of analyzing this ambiguity is asking whether the government 
is creating a customer relationship when it collects and responds to 
complaints. The foundations of democracy clearly rest on consumers as 
vital actors in a political marketplace of sorts, but the analogy can be 
stretched too far. The government is not selling something, and, at least 
without a lengthy and majoritarian process, its leadership cannot change. 
Nor can it go out of business in the conventional sense because consumers 
are dissatisfied. Lest this concept of complaining citizens as the 
government’s customers seems far-fetched, I note that the Federal 
Reserve’s website speaks of contacting a “Federal Reserve customer service 
representative.”96 Citizens may feel a stronger connection to the 
government when they think of themselves as its customers. The creation of 
vibrant forums for public complaining and satisfying aggrieved consumers 
may increase confidence in government. It provides a positive point of 
contact between the administrative branch and citizens and increases 
consumers’ belief in the government as a positive force in society. 
This discussion suggests that one purpose for government handling 
complaints in modern America is to demonstrate to citizens on an 
individual level that the government hears their concerns and will work on 
their behalf to pursue redress from industry. Note that the CFPB, like most 
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administrative government entities with complaint mechanisms, does not 
take complaints between industry actors.97 The government interferes only 
when a business has aggrieved a consumer, and upon the consumer’s 
request. 
B. LITIGATION SUBSTITUTE (CF. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN 
STATUTES) 
The fact that complaint mechanisms concern themselves only with 
consumer-business relationships reveals another purpose for the 
government handling complaints: such mechanisms are a remedial tool to 
make up for shortcomings in the courts. The administrative branch of the 
government takes complaints because the judicial branch is not effective at 
providing redress for consumers wronged by businesses. In this conception, 
the existence of a complaint mechanism in any given area is a marker of the 
failure of litigation. This “alternate dispute resolution” reason for 
complaints is a service to citizens that is distinct from the government’s 
duty to hear consumer concerns and reflect them in lawmaking discussed in 
the preceding section. The latter is largely legislative in nature, while the 
former is adjudicative. The administrative branch could well be performing 
either or both functions when it handles consumer complaints, but 
distinguishing these goals provides analytical clarity. 
The focus on obtaining relief for consumers is consistent with 
government complaint mechanisms as alternatives to filing suit in court. In 
the financial services area, Congress may have mandated “appropriate 
action” and “responses” to complaints because consumers were, and are, 
not able to bring successful actions in court to police consumer protection 
rules. Multiple factors hinder consumers in pursuing the private rights of 
action in consumer laws, including difficulty in affording lawyers or 
proceeding pro se, a lack of awareness that a legal violation has occurred 
(as opposed to a mere feeling of being wronged), and insufficient or 
inefficient remedies that undercompensate or take too long. This is not the 
place to expound upon those concerns, despite their legitimacy. The 
relevant point concerns how to evaluate complaint mechanisms. To the 
extent that such units function as substitutes for the courts, that role 
suggests comparison with private right of action outcomes as a standard for 
measuring the government’s efficacy in handling complaints. Congress has 
expressed support for this understanding of complaint mechanisms by 
stating an expectation that regulatory agencies “conduct independent 
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investigations of the complaint,” rather than merely asking the business “to 
look into the situation.”98 
One criticism of a framework for complaints as alternatives to litigation 
is that complaints are, by definition, not limited to problems that are 
violations of the law. The CFPB defines complaints in a way that 
recognizes lesser claims. “Consumer complaints are submissions that 
express dissatisfaction with, or communicate suspicion of wrongful conduct 
by, an identifiable entity related to a consumer’s personal experience with a 
financial product or service.”99 This standard not only includes both 
possible and probable legal violations, but also vague expressions of being 
wronged. Dissatisfied consumers can be widespread in lawful industries; 
indeed, financial services may be a poster child for such an industry. For 
example, most of the mortgage lending practices that were decried during 
the foreclosure crisis were lawful when they occurred, and many remain 
lawful today. Yet, millions of consumers are dissatisfied with their home 
loans and appeal to the government for help in changing their mortgage 
obligations. These are complaints that the CFPB collects, monitors, and 
tracks, even though it knows that consumers do not have the legal right to 
demand a loan modification. 
Government complaint mechanisms may siphon some claims away 
from courts and provide an alternative route to redress for legal violations. 
Lawsuits are clearly a subset of all complaints, however, suggesting that 
litigation outcomes as a benchmark for evaluating complaint mechanisms is 
only partially correct. Moreover, if complaints are a substitute for litigation, 
we would expect two additional features in such mechanisms. First, a 
requirement of administrative exhaustion before filing suit would help sort 
the most appropriate cases into courts and agencies’ complaint systems. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requirement arguably serves 
such a purpose.100 The CFPB, like most complaint systems, does not have 
such a rule. Consumers who are suing are not proper complainants,101 but 
one can sue without having ever complained. Second, if complaint systems 
replace litigation, then in at least some instances the agency should litigate 
on behalf of consumers. Agencies usually sue, however, to obtain 
widespread relief and change practices on a going-forward basis. The 
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litigation may take too long to help a particular consumer or may be 
brought against a particular business for strategic reasons rather than against 
the business that aggrieved any given consumer. 
C. KNOWLEDGE BASIS FOR LAWMAKING (CF. NOTICE AND 
COMMENT RULEMAKING) 
Complaints may provide knowledge to government agencies that aids 
them in their traditional administrative law duties. Complaints can help 
identify targets for enforcement, alert the government to new practices and 
products, and reveal perceptions about the marketplace. Such knowledge is 
useful both for enforcement and for rulemaking. In this conception, 
complaint mechanisms are an adjunct to agencies’ research units. They 
provide useful data, albeit of a nonrandom type. The repository of consumer 
complaints, including businesses’ response to them and consumers’ 
satisfaction levels with those responses, gives the government information 
on the perceptions of consumers and businesses about fairness in a 
marketplace. The knowledge value of complaints has been recognized for 
decades. One of the only law review articles on complaint systems, 
published in 1979, observed that “[a]n ideal system would improve the 
quality of goods and services by alerting producers about defects and by 
providing administrative agencies with data to guide and support 
enforcement.”102 This knowledge function for complaints can be analogized 
to the perspectives provided by a robust system of public notice-and-
comment rulemaking that generates insights on the marketplace and its 
actors’ concerns. 
The use of complaints to generate enforcement targets is related to their 
use to address weaknesses in litigation. Because public enforcement serves 
different goals than private enforcement,103 the usefulness of complaints for 
these purposes may be different. Effective public enforcement activity 
requires a deep knowledge of the marketplace. To design a successful 
strategy for rulemaking, the agency must know if the violations are 
widespread or concentrated among a few actors, the extent of damages in 
the typical and the most egregious cases, and how the practice at issue fits 
into companies’ larger businesses. Complaints can provide such 
information, and this is the likely reason for requiring the CFPB to create a 
database of complaints. 
The government cannot rely blindly on a complaint repository for 
choosing its enforcement targets. Complaints to the government are almost 
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certain to be more likely for certain kinds of violations and to be made by 
certain kinds of people. Marketing scholars have examined the propensity 
to complain and the choices people make to be passive or active after 
experiencing product dissatisfaction.104 Consumers who are less connected 
to the government because of age, immigration status, race, religion, or 
other demographic qualities may be significantly less likely to complain. 
This means that companies and products targeting certain populations may 
not be complained about in numbers or ways that attract attention. To take 
one example applicable to the CFPB, service members may refrain from 
complaining about financial problems because debt problems can be a 
violation of military honor codes or grounds for loss of security clearance. 
The law requiring the CFPB to have an Office of Service Members Affairs 
presumably reflects congressional recognition that this is a population in 
need of additional attention, including enforcement.105 
The use of complaint data for enforcement was criticized during 
reforms of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, or the Commission). One 
study found that more than two-thirds of the investigations begun by the 
Commission arose from complaints received in the mail, a reliance on 
outside complaints that it characterized as excessive.106 Former 
Commissioner Elman offered that study as a “measure of the Commission’s 
failure to follow a responsible system of priorities” in developing 
investigations based on the Commission’s own work rather than relying on 
“random ‘applications for complaint’ received from the public at large.”107 
Using the limited data from the CFPB as an example of the possibility for 
misdirection, the number of people seeking mortgage modifications surely 
says more about housing prices and the consumer protection problems of 
the past than it does about the optimal deployment of resources in forward-
looking enforcement. 
Relying on complaints to gauge enforcement needs could lead to 
substantial underenforcement or inactivity. Just as lack of awareness of 
their legal rights is a hindrance to litigation, so too does it limit consumers’ 
belief that their experiences form the basis of valid complaints. Legal 
knowledge is a prerequisite to successful enforcement activity, and 
consumers often do not know the law. On a more fundamental level, they 
may not even be complaining about a practice or product. Instead, the 
consumer may be complaining about poor customer service, such as long 
wait times in bank branches, or complex disclosures that are legally 
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mandated. In its early years, the Federal Reserve Board concluded that 
often its review “indicates that no regulation or law has been violated, but 
rather that communications between the bank and the consumer have 
broken down.”108 Those problems may reveal a dysfunctional marketplace 
for financial products, but enforcement would be an unusual solution to 
such concerns. 
The CFPB could issue rules to deal with communication problems that 
generate complaints. Confusing disclosures may not be legal violations, but 
consumers’ concerns about them could guide a redesign of those forms. 
Complaints could reveal harms of new products that are not subject to 
existing rules. Consumer groups that supported the CFPB were optimistic 
about this potential. “The agency also should be required to conduct real-
time analysis of consumer complaints regarding patterns and practices in 
the credit and payment systems industries and to apply these analyses when 
writing rules and enforcing rules and laws.”109 At its best, complaint 
handling could offer valuable insights into industry to guide rulemaking. 
There are countervailing concerns. First, industry knowledge might be 
gleaned in a less expensive and more comprehensive way than from 
handling complaints. Examination powers give the CFPB access to detailed 
data on business practices, and even simple tools like mystery shoppers 
could yield insights on problematic practices. Second, complaints are 
necessarily subjective. They may provide guidance for rulemaking, but of a 
noisy and unreliable sort. Well-written rules should improve the 
marketplace overall. They should reflect a balance of competing concerns 
between consumers and industry, not placate a minority of consumers. The 
purpose for rules is not merely to make consumers more satisfied. 
Comments submitted in response to proposed rules are also subjective, 
reflecting the perspective of their authors. But they are made available to all 
for scrutiny, and agencies must explain why they did or did not take 
account of their concerns. Even if complaint data are disclosed in various 
ways, the use of complaints to guide rulemaking is less transparent than the 
notice and comment process. The CFPB has recognized this issue, without 
mentioning complaints specifically. It has a policy of summarizing and 
publishing what it terms “ex parte presentations”—telephone calls, emails, 
and letters that it receives during a notice and comment process that pertain 
to a rule but are not submitted via official channels.110 
                                                                                                                                
 108. Oversight on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Banking Agencies: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 256 (1976) (responses to 
questions in letter of July 9, 1976 from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors, Fed. 
Reserve Sys.). 
 109. Hearing, supra note 19, at 99 (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer 
Fed’n of Am.).  
 110. CFPB, CFPB BULLETIN 11-3, POLICY ON EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS IN RULEMAKING 
PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/08/Bulletin_20110819_ExPartePresentationsRulemakingProceedings.pdf. 
82 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
Government complaint mechanisms for consumers are relatively 
undeveloped terrain. That fact has policy consequences. The CFPB faces 
choices in designing and implementing its complaint mechanism that may 
prioritize one of the identified purposes over another. Perhaps the best 
course forward is for the CFPB to be clear about its own aspirations for its 
complaint system. Within the limits of its statutory mandate to “collect, 
monitor, and respond” to complaints, the CFPB could delineate the ways in 
which complaints will bear on its other duties. A crisp and transparent 
articulation of its goals would, at minimum, advance debate about what the 
CFPB should accomplish with its complaint system. 
V. THE PARADOX OF COMPLAINTS FOR CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
The law mandates that the CFPB will have a complaint mechanism for 
the foreseeable future. The unanswered question is whether that complaint 
system will improve the overall consumer protection framework. This final 
section identifies a paradox. The CFPB’s willingness to help consumers 
with complaints may retard some of its other efforts. In the end, the CFPB’s 
complaint mechanism may not improve the equilibrium level of consumer 
protection. Considering such a possibility points to pitfalls for the CFPB to 
avoid as it builds out its complaint system. 
I begin with a brief review of the benefits of the CFPB handling 
complaints about financial products and services, taking into account its 
statutory duties and the possible purposes of government complaint 
mechanisms. On the most obvious level, some consumers will get relief 
because the CFPB forwards their complaints that they would not receive if 
they had contacted the business themselves. Fundamentally, businesses will 
reverse decisions and pay restitution to consumers who are aggrieved 
because those businesses do not want to be targets for CFPB rulemaking or 
enforcement. The early data show that the CFPB clearly will receive tens of 
thousands of complaints each year. Aiding a fraction of those complainants 
in obtaining monetary relief is a notable achievement. 
The CFPB has made remarkable efforts to be visible to consumers. It 
has deployed new technologies to reach consumers and keep them up to 
date on the CFPB’s activities, including the availability of its complaint 
system. Taking complaints is a tangible way that the CFPB shows 
consumers that it is a “cop on the beat” of consumer protection.111 The 
dissemination of complaint data also allows the public to count in a 
measurable way the benefits of the CFPB to consumers. The responses 
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from industry and consumers’ satisfaction with those responses show 
citizens that the CFPB is not a victim of regulatory capture. The database, 
particularly over time, can provide a baseline level of consumer protection 
and can disseminate data to academics and advocates for research. 
The biggest weakness in the CFPB’s complaint framework is that it will 
always fall well short of its goals. This problem is not entirely the CFPB’s 
fault. Most complaint systems seem to struggle.112 Congress has handed the 
CFPB a near impossible task in asking it to respond to every consumer 
complaint. In its early years, the FTC enjoyed protection from such an 
obligation. “It was never the intention of Congress that the Commission 
should be a forum where private disputes . . . should be settled, and the 
Commission is required to find that a proceeding is in the public interest in 
order to retain jurisdiction of it.”113 The CFPB was built, however, with 
years of frustration with the way in which the financial regulators handled 
consumer complaints in mind. The CFPB needs to do better than those 
entities or its complaint mechanism will be judged a failure. 
The CFPB has upped the stakes for its complaint system by adopting a 
robust definition of relief. It seems almost certain that the majority of 
consumers will not get relief under the CFPB’s definition. The early CFPB 
data suggest that only a fraction of consumers get relief and are satisfied 
with that relief. More depressingly, data from the other regulators suggest 
more dismal prospects once the CFPB begins handling more types of 
complaints and has higher volume. In 1967, the FTC closed more than half 
of its cases “without any action at all being taken—no complaint issued, no 
assurance of voluntary compliance taken.”114 A study of the financial 
agencies in 1976 found that only 31 percent of consumers were satisfied 
with agency resolution of their problem.115 Nearly half (49 percent) rated 
the agency’s overall handling of their complaint as poor.116 A study of both 
private and public complaint systems found that a “pervasive pattern of 
unsatisfied complaints and inadequate relief emerges from research on 
extrajudicial complaint settings.”117 
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The CFPB may do better than its predecessors or other government 
entities. To do so, however, it will almost certainly have to expend greater 
resources than other agencies. It will be expensive to follow up on 
complaints when industry does not give relief. Even auditing complaints 
that result in relief to assess their adequacy will have significant costs. Over 
time, if the CFPB realizes that its complaint system has high costs relative 
to its benefits, it may weaken the system so that it does not help the same 
number of consumers or demand that businesses provide relief. The FTC 
apparently struggled to maintain appearances for its complaint mechanism, 
which eroded significantly over time.118 
The CFPB may achieve better effects for consumers through its other 
activities, such as public enforcement, rulemaking, or education. To the 
extent that complaint data provide information for those other activities, the 
same or more reliable knowledge may be obtained at lower costs through 
different means, such as direct surveys of consumers or targeted research 
studies. There may be an inherent tension between the CFPB’s duties that 
help all citizens and its duties to handle particular complaints. 
A former Commissioner has chastised the FTC for too much orientation 
to complaints at the expense of its other duties. 
Commission members should concern themselves more with general 
problems and broad solutions, and less with individual cases and narrow 
adjudications. Agencies were created not to decide issues like “Did X 
Company do these particular acts charged against it?” but rather to 
consider questions such as “Is it unfair and anticompetitive for companies 
in this industry to engage in this kind of practice?” The more the 
Commission immerses itself in the former type of question, the less able it 
is to deal with the latter.119 
The FTC’s rules also highlight how complaint mechanisms straddle 
responsiveness to individuals and a primary mission of achieving an overall 
effect in the marketplace. Chapter 1, section .3.3 of the FTC Operating 
Manual says that “[a]n investigation of an individual, business entity or 
industry may be started as a result of public complaints, reports, or studies 
by staff.”120 Yet this ideal of consumer as client has been eroded by other 
rules. Past provisions clarified that complainants are not parties “in the 
strict sense” and do not have “legal status.”121 “The FTC does not resolve 
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individual consumer complaints.”122 These are long-standing FTC policies 
that have endured multiple administrative reforms. 
The tension between complaints and other activities is likely to face the 
CFPB on an ongoing basis. Ultimately, the solution may be for the CFPB to 
engage in strategic planning that identifies the purpose of its complaint 
mechanism. It should develop policies and procedures that spell out when 
and how complaints will guide its other duties. This kind of clarity would 
help the CFPB achieve its democratic purpose for complaint handling as 
well. Consumers, and their advocates, would know the CFPB’s 
expectations for its complaint system and have a set of goals to assess its 
efficacy. 
The resource competition between complaints and other activities is the 
first way that complaint handling may erode the overall level of consumer 
protection. If other activities that are less resource-intensive would be more 
effective, the CFPB is limiting its ability to improve the marketplace by 
dealing with individuals’ problems. The paradox that helping consumers 
could actually be hurting consumer protection could occur in at least two 
other ways. 
By channeling complaints to business, the CFPB may be giving 
industry an opportunity to head off litigation. Industry can provide modest 
recompense (that still meets the CFPB’s definition of relief) and make its 
potential plaintiffs satisfied enough. That is, there should be an inverse 
relationship between the strength of a complaint mechanism and the amount 
of private litigation. That relationship is not problematic if complaints have 
the same ability to provide restitution for consumers and deter bad acts that 
litigation outcomes do. That proposition is somewhat dubious, however, 
and is in part the exact reason why many consumer protection statutes 
provide for punitive damages and class actions.123 
The other way that a complaint mechanism can erode consumer 
protection is if it provides insufficient relief or is understaffed. If the 
government receives complaints but does not deliver relief, consumers may 
erroneously believe that they have no legal claim. Not all consumers would 
be deterred by a lack of response from the government, but some portion 
almost certainly would. This could lower the overall threat of litigation and 
its deterrent effect on businesses. In the absence of a complaint mechanism, 
some consumers would file lawsuits in the first instance because they would 
not be discouraged by the complaint experience from doing so. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the CFPB is a new agency, the problems that it will face in 
handling complaints are old. In the 1970s, a researcher found government 
complaint units fit the same “dismal pattern” as private, industry-run 
complaint systems.124 She explained that, “Dependent on the government 
for its continued existence, a public complaint agency has little or no 
incentive to respond to grievances, and instead may divide the community, 
lower complainants’ expectations, and continue to be perceived as 
legitimate despite its inadequate resolution of complaints.”125 The future 
will provide the CFPB with the opportunity to break from this tradition of 
unsatisfactory outcomes when the government handles complaints that 
consumers have with businesses. 
To date, the CFPB has developed innovative strategies to achieve 
excellence in carrying out many of its duties. The complaint system, 
however, may prove to be a conundrum for the CFPB. There are few 
successful models to consider for inspiration. The resource costs of 
handling complaints are high. The expectations of Congress and consumers 
for the CFPB may be unreasonable and almost certainly are ill-defined. On 
the bright side, the CFPB is a unique agency, born of a crisis and being 
designed in a world of new technology. Its work to date with complaints 
suggests that it may chart a new path forward for government complaint 
systems. 
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